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Abstract
We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1)
in every state, the transitions are controlled by one player, (2) the payoffs are equal to
zero in every non-absorbing state, (3) the payoffs are non-negative in every absorbing
state. With respect to the expected average reward, we provide a constructive proof
that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium exists in pure strategies, for every ε > 0. More-
over, if all transitions of a game in our class are deterministic, then the game has a
subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
Key words: stochastic games; perfect information games; recursive games; subgame-
perfect equilibria
MSC2000 subject classification: 91A15, 91A06
OR/MS subject classification: games/group decisions, stochastic
1 Introduction
In the theory of average-reward stochastic games (with finite state and action spaces), a
major open problem is whether or not ε-equilibria exist for all ε > 0. The famous game
called the Big Match, which was introduced by Gillette [5] and solved by Blackwell and
Ferguson [1], and the game in Sorin [16] demonstrated that 0-equilibria do not necessarily
exist, and moreover, that history-dependent strategies are indispensable for establishing ε-
equilibria. For two-player zero-sum games, Mertens and Neyman [8] showed the existence
of ε-equilibria, in terms of ε-optimal strategies. Later, Vieille [18], [19] provided a proof
that ε-equilibria exist in all two-player stochastic games. For more than two players,
however, only partial results are available, under rather restrictive conditions. For results
on the existence of ε-equilibria in special classes, we refer to Thuijsman and Raghavan [17],
Solan [12], Solan and Vieille [14], Simon [11], Flesch et al. [2] and Flesch et al. [3], [4].
About subgame-perfect ε-equilibria even less is known. Some recent results fell into the
class G of n-player perfect information games with recursive payoffs. Here, perfect in-
formation refers to the property that, in any state of the game, at most one player has
∗Dept. of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200MD, Maastricht, The
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more than one action (this player controls the state). We assume that the payoffs in ab-
sorbing states are non-negative, so that the players have an incentive to eventually reach
an absorbing state. It follows from Thuijsman and Raghavan [17] that equilibria exist in
the class G, but these equilibria are not subgame-perfect, since they involve punishments
where n− 1 players minimize a deviating player, without regard to their own payoffs.
Solan [13] showed for a subclass of games in G that subgame-perfect ε-equilibria exist,
for all ε > 0 (without assuming the non-negativity of the payoffs). His proof requires
two restrictions for games in G: (1) each player controls exactly one non-absorbing state,
(2) each player in his own state has the choice between two actions: one “absorbing”
action leading immediately to an absorbing state, and a “non-absorbing” one leading to
the n non-absorbing states according to a probability distribution. It is essential that this
probability distribution is the same for all n non-absorbing actions. His proof is based on
the analysis of a specific type of differential inclusions. A generalization of this result to
periodic probability distributions can be found in Mashiah-Yaakovi [7].
For another subclass of games in G, called free transition games, Kuipers et al. [6] proved
the existence of subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in pure strategies. A game G ∈ G, with T
denoting the set of non-absorbing states of G, is called a free transition game if it satisfies
the following condition: in any state s ∈ T , the action space of the controlling player is is
exactly {0} ∪ T , where action 0 is “absorbing” and leading immediately to an absorbing
state, and where action a ∈ T is “non-absorbing” and leads to non-absorbing state a with
probability 1.
In this paper, we provide a constructive proof that subgame-perfect ε-equilibria exist
in pure strategies, for all ε > 0, within the whole class G. For the subclass of games
with deterministic transitions the proof simplifies, and the existence of subgame-perfect
0-equilibria in pure strategies is guaranteed. Our construction uses history-dependent
strategies, which is necessary, as stationary strategies are in general insufficient for ε-
equilibria (cf., for example, Solan and Vieille [15] or Kuipers et al. [6]). Although our
approach relies on the properties of the games in the class G, it is very natural and may
initiate further results outside this class. In this respect, we wish to mention two related
models, in which there is an ongoing investigation regarding the existence of equilibria
and subgame-perfect equilibria. First, we mention a class of Dynkin games, where in
each state (of a possibly infinite state space), the controlling player has one non-absorbing
action, called “continue”, and one absorbing action, called “quit” (cf. for example, Solan
and Vieille [15] and Solan [13]). Another related model is the class of so-called stopping
games, where in contrast with Dynkin games, several players may choose simultaneously
between actions “continue” and “quit” (cf. for example, Shmaya et al. [10] and Shmaya
and Solan [9]).
2 The model and the main results
The class G of stochastic games An n-player stochastic game in class G is given by
(1) a nonempty set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, (2) a nonempty and finite set of states S,
(3) for each state t ∈ S, an associated ’controlling’ player it ∈ N , (4) for each state t ∈ S,
a nonempty and finite set of actions At, (5) for each state t ∈ S and each action a ∈ At,
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a transition probability distribution pt(a) = (pt(a, u))u∈S , (6) for each state t ∈ S and
each action a ∈ At, a payoff r
i
t(a) ∈ R to each player i, such that the payoffs are equal
to 0 in all non-absorbing states and the payoffs are non-negative in all absorbing states.
Here, a state t is called absorbing if pt(a, t) = 1 for all actions a ∈ At; otherwise t is called
non-absorbing.
The game is to be played at stages in N in the following way. At any stagem, in the present
state sm ∈ S, the controlling player ism has to choose an action am from the action set
Asm . The chosen action am induces a payoff r
j
sm(am) to each player j, and a transition
to a new state according to the transition probability distribution psm(am), where play
will continue at stage m + 1. We assume complete information (i.e. the players know
all the data of the stochastic game), full monitoring (i.e. the players observe the present
state and the action chosen by the controlling player), and perfect recall (i.e. the players
remember all previous states and actions). The game starts in an initial state s ∈ S.
Strategies A mixed action in state t ∈ S for player it is a probability distribution on
At. The set of these mixed actions is denoted by Xt. For a ∈ At, let St(a) = {u ∈
S | pt(a, u) > 0} denote the set of states to which transition occurs with a positive
probability when action a is taken at state t. Let Hs,t denote the set of all possible
sequences (s = s1, a1, . . . , sm, am, sm+1 = t) of arbitrary but finite length, where for every
k = 1, . . . ,m we have that (a) sk is a state and ak is an action of the controlling player
player isk in state sk, (b) sk+1 ∈ Ssk(ak). Thus, Hs,t is the set of all possible histories
starting in initial state s and ending in state t.
A strategy pii for player i and initial state s is a decision rule that, for any history h ∈ Hs,t
with i = it, prescribes a mixed action pi
i(h) ∈ Xt. We use the notation Π
i
s for the set
of strategies for player i and initial state s.1 A strategy pii ∈ Πis is called pure if every
prescription pii(h) places probability 1 on one action. If the mixed actions prescribed by
a strategy only depend on the final state of h, then the strategy is called stationary. We
use the notation Πs for the set of joint strategies pi = (pi
i)i∈N with pi
i ∈ Πis for i ∈ N . A
joint strategy pi = (pii)i∈N is pure if pi
i is pure for all i ∈ N , and it is stationary if pii is
stationary for all i ∈ N .
Consider a strategy pii ∈ Πis and a history h ∈ Hs,t. The continuation strategy pi
i[h] ∈ Πit
for player i and initial state t prescribes mixed actions for histories h′ ∈ Ht,u with iu = i
according to pii, but as if h had happened before h′. More formally, the continuation
strategy pii[h] prescribes the mixed action pii[h](h′) = pii(h ⊕ h′) in state u. Here, h ⊕ h′
is the history obtained by concatenation of h and h′ (where t, the final state of h and the
initial state of h′, merge to one state t in h⊕ h′). We use the notation pi[h] to denote the
joint continuation strategy, associated with pi = (pii)i∈N and h ∈ Hs,t.
Rewards For initial state s ∈ S and a joint strategy pi ∈ Πs, the sequences of payoffs are
evaluated by the expected average reward, which is given for player i by
φi(pi) := lim inf
M→∞
Epi
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Rim
)
= lim inf
M→∞
1
M
M∑
m=1
Epi
(
Rim
)
,
1In this article, a strategy provides prescriptions for histories with a given initial state, and it provides
no prescriptions for other initial states. This is to conform with the concept of a continuation strategy, to
be defined later on.
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where Rim is the random variable for the payoff for player i at stage m, and where Epi
stands for expectation with respect to play according to the joint strategy pi.
Equilibria A joint strategy pi = (pii)i∈N ∈ Πs is called a (Nash) ε-equilibrium for initial
state s, for some ε ≥ 0, if
φi
(
σi, (pij)j∈N−{i}
)
≤ φi (pi) + ε ∀σi ∈ Πis, ∀i ∈ N,
which means that no player can gain more than ε by a unilateral deviation. A strategy
profile pi = (pis)s∈S , with pis ∈ Πs for all s ∈ S, is called a (Nash) ε-equilibrium, for some
ε ≥ 0, if pis is a Nash-equilibrium for initial state s for all s ∈ S. As we mentioned in the
introduction, a 0-equilibrium exists in every game in the class G, but not in stationary
strategies in general.
Subgame-perfect equilibria A joint strategy pi ∈ Πs is called a subgame-perfect ε-
equilibrium for initial state s, for some ε ≥ 0, if for any t ∈ S and history h ∈ Hs,t, the
joint continuation strategy pi[h] is an ε-equilibrium for initial state t. A strategy profile
pi = (pis)s∈S , with pis ∈ Πs for all s ∈ S, is called a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium, for
some ε ≥ 0, if pis is a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium for initial state s for all s ∈ S.
Subgame-perfection is a refinement of the equilibrium concept.
Our main results concern the existence of subgame-perfect ε-equilibria in the class G
of stochastic games. We will pay special attention to the case when all transitions are
deterministic, i.e. when for every state s ∈ S and action a ∈ As, there exists a state t ∈ S
such that ps(a, t) = 1.
Main Theorem Every stochastic game G in class G has a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium
in pure strategies, for every ε > 0. Moreover, if all transitions in G are deterministic,
then G has a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
The article is structured as follows. In section 3, we prove a useful lemma claiming that,
for the main theorem, it suffices to consider games in a subclass G′ of G. In section 4, we
introduce notions that will play an important role in our analysis. Finally, in section 5,
we present the proof of the main theorem for the subclass G′.
3 A reduction
In this section, we will show that, for our main results, it is sufficient to guarantee the
existence of pure subgame-perfect ε-equilibria in a subclass of G. Let G′ denote the class
of games in G which satisfy:
(1) From any state, the players have a joint strategy such that absorption eventually
occurs with probability 1. (One can show that it is sufficient to consider pure sta-
tionary strategies.)
(2) In any absorbing state s, player is has precisely one action.
(3) In any non-absorbing state s, any action of player is either leads to non-absorbing
states only, or it leads to one absorbing state with probability 1. In this sense, we
will speak of non-absorbing and absorbing actions.
4
(4) In any non-absorbing state s, player is has precisely one absorbing action.
Now we will provide a natural transformation which reduces an arbitrary game G ∈ G
into a game G′ ∈ G′. So, take a game G ∈ G. We obtain G′ in four steps as follows:
Step 1 for property (1): If G does not satisfy this property, then there must exist a state
s such that, irrespective of the strategies of the players, the probability that play ever
absorbs is zero. This means the payoffs are zeros regardless what happens. For this
reason, we replace all such states by absorbing states in which the controlling player has
one action and all payoffs are equal to zero.
Step 2 for property (2): In any absorbing state s, we delete all actions of player is except
one that offers player is the highest payoff in state s.
Step 3 for property (3): Suppose that, in some non-absorbing state s, some action a of
player is does not satisfy this property. Then, action a leads to the set of absorbing states
with a positive probability. Given absorption takes place through action a, let wj denote
the conditional expected payoff for player j in the set of absorbing states. More formally,
wj =
∑
u ∈ S, u is absorbing
ps(a, u) · r
j
u∑
u ∈ S, u is absorbing
ps(a, u)
,
where rju denotes the unique payoff (cf. property (2)) for player j in absorbing state
u. Then, (i) we add two new states: (ia) we add a new absorbing state s∗ in which
the controlling player has one action and the payoff for every player j is equal to wj ,
(ib) we add a new non-absorbing state s′ with one action for the controlling player from
which transition occurs to state s∗ with probability 1, and (ii) we replace each transition
through action a to an absorbing state by a transition to state s′. We apply the same
transformation to all actions that violate property (3).
Step 4 for property (4): If in some non-absorbing state s, player is has more than one
absorbing action, then we delete all absorbing actions of player is except one that offers
player is the highest payoff at absorption. We apply the same transformation to all such
states. Suppose now on the other hand that there is a non-absorbing state s in which
player is has no absorbing action. Let S
0 denote the set of these states. Then, (i) we raise
all payoffs in the absorbing states by 1, (ii) we add a new absorbing state t∗ in which the
controlling player has one action and all payoffs are equal to 0, (iii) in each state in S0,
we add a new absorbing action leading to state t∗.
It is clear that the new game G′ satisfies all four properties, thus G′ ∈ G′.
Lemma 1 Take an arbitrary game G ∈ G, and transform G, according to the rules above,
into a game G′ ∈ G′. If a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium exists in G′ in pure strategies for
all ε > 0, then one also exists in G. Moreover, if a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium exists
in G′ in pure strategies, then one also exists in G.
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Proof. We only show the second part, as the proof for the first part on subgame-perfect
ε-equilibria is almost identical. Now let pi denote a pure subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in
the game G′. We will show that pi induces a pure subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium for the
original game G.
We will only argue for the transformation in step 4, as it is obvious for the other three
steps. It is enough to show that pi never prescribes to choose the new absorbing actions
in states in S0. Suppose S0 6= ∅, otherwise the statement is obvious. Let T denote the set
of states after the transformation in step 3 (T can differ from the original state space S
due to step 3). Due to the transformation in step 1, T − S0 6= ∅. Consider first a state
s ∈ T−S0. In this state, player is can obtain a payoff of at least 1 by playing his absorbing
action. Hence, his continuation reward from state s with regard to pi is always at least
1. Notice that the payoffs in any absorbing state are either all at least 1 or all equal to
0. Hence, each player’s (expected) continuation reward from state s with regard to pi is
always at least some ρs > 0. Due to the transformation in step 1, there exists a state
t ∈ S0 with an action a such that action a leads to S −S0 with a positive probability, say
qa. Then, if player it plays action a in state t, his continuation reward with respect to pi
is at least qa ·mins∈S−S0 ρs > 0. Hence, the continuation reward of player it from state t
with regard to pi, and consequently for all other players as well, is at least some ρt > 0.
This means in particular that player it never plays his new absorbing action in state t. If
S0 −{t} = ∅, then we are done. On the other hand, if S0 −{t} 6= ∅, then we can continue
as before, since there exists again a state u ∈ S0 − {t} with an action b such that action
b leads to (T − S0) ∪ {t} with a positive probability. Since the number of states is finite,
we obtain in finitely many steps a ρ > 0 such that the continuation rewards of the players
with regard to pi are always at least ρ. Hence, the new absorbing actions in states in S0
are never chosen, as desired. 
Due to the above lemma, we may restrict our investigation to games in the class G′.
An equivalent interpretation of games in G′. Note that, in every state s of a game
belonging to G′, if player is plays his absorbing action, then play moves with probability 1
to the absorbing state associated with s, say t(s). Play is over from a strategic point of
view once t(s) is reached, and each player j receives an (expected) reward equal to rj
t(s).
From now on, we will use the following equivalent interpretation of games in G′: in every
non-absorbing state s ∈ S, if player is plays his absorbing action then play terminates,
with payoff rjs := r
j
t(s) to every player j. If the players never use their absorbing actions,
play continues forever with payoff 0 to every player. In this interpretation, the absorbing
states play no role. Playing the absorbing action in a non-absorbing state will be called
quitting. Moreover, the absorbing actions will be called quitting actions, and all other
actions will be called non-quitting actions.
4 Game-plans and viability
Take a stochastic game G ∈ G′ and an initial state s ∈ S. For a joint pure strategy pi ∈ Πs,
let Hpi denote the set of those histories which have a positive probability with respect to
pi. A function g from histories to actions is called a complete game-plan for initial state
s if g equals the restriction pi|Hpi of some joint pure strategy pi ∈ Πs to the set H
pi. Let
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Hg = Hpi denote the domain of g. Thus, g(h) = pi(h) for all h ∈ Hg. Clearly, different
joint pure strategies can induce the same complete game-plan. The idea of a complete
game-plan is that it provides a prescription for the choice of an action during the whole
play, if no player ever deviates from the plan. We say that a game-plan g is stationary if
g(h) only depend on the final state of h.
It is also possible to construct a complete game-plan g for initial state s inductively, as
follows.
(1) At stage 1, an action g(s) ∈ As is chosen. Define H
g,1 = {(s)}.
(2) At stage m+1 (m ≥ 1), an action g(h) ∈ Au is chosen for all histories h of the form
h = hm⊕ (t, g(hm), u), where hm ∈ Hg,m, where t denotes the final state of hm, and
where u ∈ St(g(h
m)). Let Hg,m+1 denote the set of such histories h.
The domain of such a constructed game-plan g is given by Hg = ∪m∈NH
g,m.
A function g from histories to actions is called a truncated game-plan for initial state s if g
equals the restriction pi|W of a joint pure strategy pi to a setW $ Hpi of histories such that
W satisfies: if h ∈W is an arbitrary history, say up to stage m, then, for any stage l < m,
the part of h up to stage l also belongs to W . An equivalent formulation of this property
of the set W is that if a history does not belong to W , then neither does any extension
of this history up to larger stages. Note that if the players follow the prescriptions of a
truncated game-plan g, then it may happen that a history h ∈ Hpi −W occurs. In this
case, g provides no further prescriptions, and we will say that g expires. Also for the
truncated game-plan g, let Hg =W denote the domain of g.
Example 1 Consider a game G with three players and three states s, t and u. In state s,
player 1 can either play a non-quitting action as leading to state s with probability
1
2 and
to state t with probability 12 , or quit. In state t, player 2 can either play a non-quitting
action at leading to state u with probability 1, or play the quitting action. In state u,
player 3 can only quit. Consider state s as the initial state. An example of a complete
game-plan is gˆ, which prescribes action as in state s until play arrives at state t and then
quits in state t. More formally, H gˆ consists of all histories that are either of the form
(s, as, s, as, . . . , s, as, s) or of the form (s, as, s, as, . . . , s, as, t), and gˆ assigns action as to
the former ones and quitting to the latter ones. An example of a truncated game-plan is
g′ which prescribes action as in state s until play arrives at state t. More formally, H
g′
consists of all histories of the form (s, as, s, as, . . . , s, as, s), and g
′ assigns action as to all
these histories.
Consider a (complete or truncated) game-plan g for initial state s. For any h ∈ Hg, we
can define the continuation game-plan g[h] of g with respect to h by g[h](h′) = g(h⊕ h′)
for all h′ with h⊕h′ ∈ Hg, just as in the case of strategies. Notice that g[h] is a game-plan
for the final state of h. In the following we will sometimes use the notation Hgt to denote
the histories in Hg with final state t. Thus, if h ∈ Hgt , then g[h] is a game-plan for state
t. Note that g[h] is complete if g is complete.
A complete game-plan g is called quitting, if playing according to g eventually leads to
quitting, with probability 1. For a quitting game-plan g, the expected payoff to a player
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i is denoted by φi(g). Note that any continuation game-plan g[h] of a quitting game-plan
g is also quitting.
Take a real vector α = (αt)t∈S . A quitting game-plan g is called viable with respect to α,
if φit(g[h]) ≥ αt holds for all t ∈ S and all h ∈ H
g
t . This means that, whenever play is in
some state t, and play is according to g, the controlling player it can expect a payoff of at
least αt. In particular, viability of g with respect to α implies that termination can only
take place at states t with the property ritt ≥ αt. A state t with this property is called a
quitting state with respect to α.
Let Vs(α) denote the set of game-plans for initial state s that are viable with respect to α.
A specific viable game-plan will be denoted by v. Note that, for a game-plan v ∈ Vs(α) and
a history h ∈ Hv with final state t, the continuation game-plan v[h] is a viable game-plan
in Vt(α). Notice that viable game-plans are, by definition, always quitting and complete.
Example 2 Consider the game G from example 1 and game-plan gˆ for initial state s as
defined in that example. Let the payoff vectors be given by (2, 2, 2), (3, 1, 2), and (1, 2, 2)
for s, t and u respectively. Let αs = αu = 2 and αt = 1. According to gˆ, whenever play is
in state s, player 1’s expected payoff is equal to 3 > 2 = αs, and whenever play is in state
t, player 2 receives 1 = αt. Hence, gˆ is viable with respect to α.
Consider two states t, u ∈ S, and a real vector α = (αt)t∈S . We define
βt(u, α) =
{
inf
v∈Vu(α)
φit(v) when Vu(α) 6= ∅
∞ otherwise,
which is the highest lower-bound for the payoff to player it with regard to viable game-
plans starting in state u. Note that we cannot guarantee that the infimum is attained (cf.
the concluding remarks).
Now, we can also define such a bound for an action a ∈ At of player it in state t as follows:
γt(a, α) =
{ ∑
u∈S
pt(a, u)βt(u, α) if action a is non-quitting
ritt if action a is quitting.
Let further
δt(α) = max
a∈At
γt(a, α).
The main motivation for these definitions is the following. Let ε ≥ 0. It is easily proved
(cf. Lemma 3) that δt(α) ≥ αt for all t ∈ S. Suppose that also αt ≥ r
it
t and δt(α) ≤ αt+
1
2ε
for some state t and some vector α ∈ R|S|. Consider the situation that play is in state
t, according to some game-plan v which is viable with respect to α. If the players follow
the prescriptions of v, then due to viability, player it will receive a payoff of at least αt
in expectation. Suppose, however, that player it deviates by playing a non-prescribed
action a. If a is quitting then player it receives payoff r
it
t ≤ αt, which is no improvement.
Otherwise, if a is non-quitting, then notice the following. As δt(α) ≤ αt+
1
2ε, it is possible
to switch to a new game-plan vu ∈ Vu(α) from the next state u such that∑
u∈S
pt(a, u)φ
it(vu) ≤
∑
u∈S
pt(a, u)βt(u, α) +
1
2
ε = γt(a, α) +
1
2
ε ≤ δt(α) +
1
2
ε ≤ αt + ε.
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This means that, after any deviation, player it’s expected payoff, with regard to the new
game-plan, increases by at most ε. This idea will later be used when deriving the existence
of subgame-perfect ε-equilibria.
We finally define Bt(α) as the set of those actions a for player it in state t for which
γt(a, α) = δt(α).
By the definition of δt(α), the set Bt(α) is always nonempty. Observe that if δt(α) = ∞,
then Bt(α) consists of those non-quitting actions a in state t for which there is a state
u ∈ St(a) with Vu(α) = ∅.
The following lemma provides useful properties of these functions. Its proof follows
straightforwardly from the definitions.
Lemma 2 If α ≥ α, then we have for all states t ∈ S that
1. Vt(α) ⊆ Vt(α);
2. βt(u, α) ≥ βt(u, α) for all u ∈ S;
3. γt(a, α) ≥ γt(a, α) for all a ∈ At;
4. δt(α) ≥ δt(α).
5 Subgame-perfect ε-equilibria in pure strategies in G ′
In this section, we prove the existence of subgame-perfect ε-equilibria, in pure strategies,
for all games in the class G′. So, consider an arbitrary game G ∈ G′. We start with an
iterative scheme, which will appear to converge to a finite limit. We define a sequence
α0, α1, . . . of vectors, where αk = (αkt )t∈S ∈ R
|S|, as follows. For k = 0, we set α0t = r
it
t for
all states t ∈ S. Given αk, we define αk+1t = δt(α
k) for all states t ∈ S.
Lemma 3 For all k ≥ 0 it holds that αk+1 ≥ αk.
Proof. The proof is by complete induction. Let at denote the quitting action in state t.
For k = 0 we have for any state t ∈ S that
α1t = δt(α
0) ≥ γt(at, α
0) = ritt = α
0
t .
Assume now that αk ≥ αk−1 holds for some k ≥ 1. Then, by lemma 2-4, we obtain for
any state t ∈ S that
αk+1t = δt(α
k) ≥ δt(α
k−1) = αkt ,
which completes the proof. 
Observe the following. For any state t ∈ S, at any iteration level k, either αkt = ∞ or
αkt is bounded from above by the maximal payoff of the game. Since the sequence α
k
t
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(k = 0, 1, . . .) is nondecreasing, αkt will either converge to a finite limit, or, after a finite
number of iterations, αkt =∞. We will call this limit α
∗
t , and set α
∗ = (α∗t )t∈S .
Example 3 Consider the following game G. There are 4 players, so N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The
state space is S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, with player i controlling state si. In state si, player i’s
action space is Asi = {a
i
1, a
i
2, a
i
3, a
i
4}, where action a
i
j , with j 6= i, leads to state sj with
probability 1 whereas action aii is quitting. The payoffs for quitting are:
rs1 = (1, 1, 3, 1), rs2 = (1, 1, 1, 1), rs3 = (1, 2, 2, 1), rs4 = (2, 1, 1, 2).
Obviously, G ∈ G′, and all transitions in G are deterministic. We are going to perform
the iteration scheme defined above, and we will see that it allows us to construct a pure
subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium. For simplicity, a quitting game-plan for initial state t1 ∈ S
will be denoted by (t1, t2, . . . , tm, ∗), where tl 6= tl+1 for all l = 1, . . . ,m − 1, with the
interpretation that in state t1 action a
t1
t2
should be played, leading to state t2, then in
state t2 action a
t2
t3
should be played, leading to state t3, and so on until quitting should
take place in state tm.
Step 0: Initially, α0s1 = α
0
s2
= 1 and α0s3 = α
0
s4
= 2. Notice that, since player 4 receives less
than α0s4 = 2 in all states except his own state s4, all game-plans which are viable with
regard to α0 and which start in state s4, will eventually quit in state s4.
Regarding player 1: Due to the above observation, we obtain βs1(s4, α
0) = 2 and a14 ∈
Bs1(α
0). Hence, α1s1 = 2.
Regarding player 2: We have βs2(s1, α
0) = 1 as the game-plan (s1, s4, ∗) (or simply quitting
in state s1 immediately) is viable with regard to α
0. Also, βs2(s3, α
0) = 1, as (s3, s1, ∗) is
viable with regard to α0. Clearly, βs2(s4, α
0) = 1. Thus, βs2(t, α
0) = 1 for all states t ∈ S,
yielding α1s2 = 1.
Regarding player 3: Since (s1, s2, ∗) is viable with respect to α
0, it follows that α1s3 = 2.
Regarding player 4: Of course, α1s4 = 2.
Step 1: We obtained α1s1 = α
1
s3
= α1s4 = 2 and α
1
s2
= 1. The main difference is that
quitting in state s1 is no longer viable for player 1. This means that (s3, s1, ∗) is not viable
with regard to α1. Hence, βs2(s3, α
1) = 2 yielding α2s2 = 2. Thus, α
2
t = 2 for all states
t ∈ S.
Step 2: We obtained α2t = 2 for all states t ∈ S. It is easy to see that α
k = α2 for all
k > 2, implying α∗t = 2 for all states t ∈ S.
Consider the following game-plans, which are all viable with respect to α∗:
gs1 = (s1, s4, ∗), gs2 = (s2, s3, ∗), gs3 = (s3, ∗), gs4 = (s4, ∗).
Now we obtain a pure subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium as follows. From any initial state
s ∈ S, game-plan gs should be played. If any player along the way deviates from gs to a
non-quitting action, by which play moves to state t, then game-plan gt should be played
from state t. And similarly, if a deviation occurs from gt to a non-quitting action leading
to state u, then game-plan gu should be played from state u, and so on. It is easy to check
that this prescription provides a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium.
The following lemma considers concatenations of an action with viable game-plans.
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Lemma 4 Suppose Vt(α
k) 6= ∅ and let vt ∈ Vt(α
k) for all t ∈ S. Choose an initial state
s ∈ S, and an action a ∈ As. Construct a game-plan v for initial state s as follows.
(1) At stage 1, player is plays action a;
(2) If action a is non-quitting and play reaches state t ∈ Ss(a), then from stage 2 on-
wards, game-plan vt will be played (with forgetting the history before stage 2 and
considering state t as the initial state).
If either a ∈ Bs(α
k−1) or a ∈ Bs(α
k), then v ∈ Vs(α
k).
Proof. First assume that a is the quitting action. If a ∈ Bs(α
k−1), then δs(α
k−1) =
γs(a, α
k−1), hence we obtain
αks = δs(α
k−1) = γs(a, α
k−1) = riss .
If a ∈ Bs(α
k), then δs(α
k) = γs(a, α
k), hence
αks ≤ α
k+1
s = δs(α
k) = γs(a, α
k) = riss ,
where the inequality follows from lemma 3. In either case, quitting is viable with respect
to αk.
Now assume that a is non-quitting. Since vt ∈ Vt(α
k) for every state t ∈ Ss(a), we conclude
that the game-plan v is quitting and that φiu(v[h]) ≥ αku holds for any u ∈ S and any
history h ∈ Hvu that reaches stage 2. It remains to show that φ
is(v) ≥ αks . As
φis(v) =
∑
t∈Ss(a)
ps(a, t)φ
is(vt) ≥
∑
t∈Ss(a)
ps(a, t)βs(t, α
k) = γs(a, α
k),
it suffices to verify γs(a, α
k) ≥ αks . We distinguish two cases: a ∈ Bs(α
k−1) or a ∈ Bs(α
k).
If a ∈ Bs(α
k−1), we obtain
αks = δs(α
k−1) = γs(a, α
k−1) ≤ γs(a, α
k),
where the inequality follows from lemmas 2-3 and 3. On the other hand, if a ∈ Bs(α
k),
we have
αks ≤ α
k+1
s = δs(α
k) = γs(a, α
k),
where the inequality follows from lemma 3. Hence, φis(v) ≥ αks , as desired. 
The following lemma considers concatenations of a truncated game-plan with viable game-
plans.
Lemma 5 Suppose Vt(α
k) 6= ∅ and let vt ∈ Vt(α
k) for all t ∈ S. Choose an initial state
s ∈ S, and let g be a truncated game-plan for s that only uses actions from the sets
Bu(α
k−1) and Bu(α
k) for every state u ∈ S, and that expires with probability 1. Let v
denote the complete game-plan for initial state s, according to which
(1) from stage 1 onwards, game-plan g is executed, and
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(2) when g expires, say in state t, game-plan vt will be played (with forgetting the history
induced by g and considering state t as the initial state).
Then v ∈ Vs(α
k).
Proof. It is clear that v is a quitting game-plan. We need to prove that v is viable
with respect to αk. For any m ∈ N, consider the following game-plan vm, by adapting
v: if, at stage m, the game-plan g has not expired yet, and play is in some state t, then
start game-plan vt. Note that vm is viable with respect to α
k for all m, which follows by
repeated application of lemma 4. Let ε > 0. Since g expires with probability 1, we can
choose m so large that the probability that g expires before stage m is so close to 1 that
φis(vm) ≤ φ
is(v) + ε.
Since vm ∈ Vs(α
k), we have
φis(vm) ≥ α
k
s .
Therefore,
φis(v) ≥ φis(vm)− ε ≥ α
k
s − ε.
Since ε > 0 was arbitrary, we proved φis(v) ≥ αks .
Observe that, for any t ∈ S and any history h ∈ Hvt , the above reasoning can also be given
for v[h] to show that φit([h]) ≥ αkt . Hence, v ∈ Vs(α
k). 
Let k ∈ N. For two states s and t, we write s k t if state t can eventually be visited with
a positive probability when starting in s, by only using actions in the sets Bu(α
k), u ∈ S.
This relation k is obviously transitive. With respect to k, a nonempty set Q ⊆ S is
called closed, if for every s ∈ Q there is no t ∈ S−Q such that s k t. A closed set Q ⊆ S
is called minimal closed if Q contains no proper subset which is closed. We will call every
minimal closed set a persistent set and its elements persistent states with respect to αk.
It is clear that there always exists a persistent set. Thus, we have the following properties
for persistent states: (i) from any non-persistent state, we can eventually reach the set of
persistent states with probability 1, by only using actions in the sets Bu(α
k), u ∈ S, (ii)
a persistent set P k cannot be left through actions in the sets Bu(α
k), u ∈ P k, and (iii) if
s and t 6= s belong to the same persistent set P k, then t can eventually be visited when
starting in s with probability 1, by only using actions in the sets Bu(α
k), u ∈ P k.
The next lemma derives an essential property of persistent states.
Lemma 6 Suppose that Vu(α
k) 6= ∅ for all u ∈ S. Take a persistent state s ∈ S with
respect to αk. Then
1. If a ∈ Bs(α
k−1) (which implies k > 0), then a ∈ Bs(α
k);
2. If a is quitting and k = 0, then a ∈ Bs(α
0).
Proof. Let a ∈ Bs(α
k−1) if k > 0 or let a be quitting if k = 0. We will show that
a ∈ Bs(α
k). Let P k denote the persistent set with respect to αk that state s belongs to.
For every state t ∈ P k, we define a game-plan vt, starting in state t, according to which:
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(1) From stage 1 onwards, starting in state t, a truncated game-plan will be used to
eventually visit state s, by only using actions in the sets Bu(α
k), u ∈ P k. Such a game-
plan exists by property (iii) of persistent states. (If t = s, then this truncated game-plan
is empty.) Notice that the game-plan expires in state s with probability 1.
(2) When s is reached, say at stage m ≥ 1, action a will be played.
(3) If a is non-quitting, choose viable game-plans wu ∈ Vu(α
k) for all u ∈ Ss(a). From
stage m+ 1 onwards, if u′ ∈ Ss(a) denotes the state at stage m+ 1, the viable game-plan
wu′ will be played (with forgetting the history before stage m+1 and considering state u
′
as the initial state).
We have vt ∈ Vt(α
k) for all t ∈ P k. If k > 0, then a ∈ Bs(α
k−1), and viability follows by
lemma 5. If k = 0, then a is quitting, and as quitting is always viable with respect to α0,
viability of vt follows by lemma 5.
We claim that
βs(t, α
k) ≤ γs(a, α
k)
for all t ∈ P k. As vt ∈ Vt(α
k), for all t ∈ P k, we have βs(t, α
k) ≤ φis(vt). If a is quitting,
then each game-plan vt terminates at s with payoff r
is
s for is, in which case the claim
follows from
βs(t, α
k) ≤ φis(vt) = r
is
s = γs(a, α
k).
If a is non-quitting, then each game-plan vt induces the payoff
φis(vt) =
∑
u∈Ss(a)
ps(a, u)φ
is(wu).
The claim now follows from
βs(t, α
k) ≤
∑
u∈Ss(a)
ps(a, u)
[
inf
wu∈Vu(αk)
φis(wu)
]
=
∑
u∈Ss(a)
ps(a, u)βs(u, α
k) = γs(a, α
k),
since the choice of wu was arbitrary in Vu(α
k) for all u ∈ Ss(a).
Now take b ∈ Bs(α
k). We claim that
γs(b, α
k) ≤ γs(a, α
k).
If b is quitting, this claim follows from γs(b, α
k) = riss ≤ γs(a, α
k). If b is non-quitting,
then, due to s ∈ P k and b ∈ Bs(α
k), we have Ss(b) ⊆ P
k. Therefore, the claim follows
from
γs(b, α
k) =
∑
t∈Ss(b)
ps(b, t)βs(t, α
k) ≤
∑
t∈Ss(b)
ps(b, t)γs(a, α
k) = γs(a, α
k).
Since b ∈ Bs(α
k), we may derive
δs(α
k) = γs(b, α
k) ≤ γs(a, α
k),
which implies a ∈ Bs(α
k), as desired. 
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Lemma 7 If t is a quitting state with respect to αk and if t is persistent with respect to
αk, then t is a quitting state with respect to αk+1.
Proof. Let t be a persistent quitting state with respect to αk and let a denote the
quitting action. If k = 0, then a ∈ Bt(α
k) by lemma 6. If k > 0, then a ∈ Bt(α
k−1),
since δt(α
k−1) = αkt = r
it
t = γt(a, α
k−1). So if k > 0, a ∈ Bt(α
k) also follows by lemma 6.
Consequently, αk+1t = δt(α
k) = γt(a, α
k) = ritt . 
We are now ready to prove that the iterative scheme converges to a finite limit.
Lemma 8
1. Vs(α
k) 6= ∅ for all k ≥ 0 and all s ∈ S,
2. Every persistent set with respect to αk contains quitting states with respect to αk.
3. The limit α∗ of the iterative process αk is finite.
Proof. We prove 1 and 2 by induction on k. Notice that both 1 and 2 are trivially true
for k = 0. Now assume 1 and 2 are true for some k ≥ 0.
To prove claim 1 for k + 1, notice that a truncated game-plan for s ∈ S exists that
only uses actions in the sets Bu(α
k) (u ∈ S), and that expires with probability 1 in
a persistent set with respect to αk. This follows by property (i) of persistent states.
Moreover, the truncated game-plan can be extended to a truncated game-plan that expires
with probability 1 at a quitting state with respect to αk, only by actions in the sets Bu(α
k),
by property (iii) of persistent sets and by the assumption that 2 holds for k. We then
complete the game-plan, which we denote by ws, by choosing the quitting action when a
quitting state with respect to αk is reached. By lemma 7, the state is also quitting with
respect to αk+1, and we may apply lemma 5, to derive that ws ∈ Vs(α
k+1).
To prove 2 for k + 1, let P k+1 be a persistent set with respect to αk+1, choose s ∈ P k+1
arbitrarily, and construct the game-plan ws ∈ Vs(α
k+1) as above. We claim that the game-
plan ws only visits states in P
k+1. This is trivial for state s visited at stage 1. Assume it is
true for a state t visited at stage m. By construction of ws, the action at state t is chosen
from Bt(α
k). By lemma 6, this action is also in Bt(α
k+1). Therefore, the state visited
at stage m + 1 is again in P k+1, by property (ii) of persistent sets. This demonstrates
that ws terminates with probability 1 in P
k+1. Since ws ∈ Vs(α
k+1), it follows that P k+1
contains quitting states with respect to αk+1.
To prove 3, notice that due to 1, each αks is finite for all s ∈ S and k ∈ N. Moreover,
as each αks is a convex combination of payoffs in the game, it is bounded from above by
the maximal payoff. Since the sequence (αk)k∈N is non-decreasing, it converges to a finite
limit. 
Now we are ready to show Main Theorem 1 restricted to games in G′.
Theorem 9 In every stochastic game G in class G′, there exists a subgame-perfect ε-
equilibrium in pure strategies, for every ε > 0. Moreover, if all transitions in G are
deterministic, then G has a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
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Proof. General transitions: We start by showing the case of general transitions. Take a
stochastic game G in G′. We assume that all payoffs at quitting are at least 1; otherwise
we can raise all payoffs at quitting by 1 (for any ε ≥ 0, any subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium
in this modified game is also a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in the original game). Take
an initial state s ∈ S. Let ε > 0 and let k ∈ N be so large that∥∥∥α∗ − αk∥∥∥ ≤ ε
4|S|
,
where the norm is the maximum-norm, and where |S| equals the number of states.
We will now define a joint pure strategy piε, and show that piε is a subgame-perfect ε-
equilibrium for initial state s.
Step 1: Definition of piε. We will define the joint pure strategy piε inductively. Let s1 = s
and take an arbitrary game-plan v1 ∈ Vs1(α
k). When starting in state s1, the joint
strategy piε prescribes to play according to the game-plan v1, as long as all players follow
the prescriptions of v1. If, on the other hand, in some state, the controlling player ignores
the prescription by v1 and deviates to a non-quitting action, by which play moves to
some state s2, then piε prescribes to switch to a certain new game-plan v2 ∈ Vs2(α
k+1).
This game-plan v2, to be specified later, will be used as long as all players follow the
prescriptions by v2. And similarly, if deviation occurs at some point to a non-quitting
action, then piε prescribes another new game-plan v3 ∈ Vs3(α
k+2) from the state s3 right
after the deviation, and so on. Thus, with respect to piε, a game-plan is active at any
point during play.
We will now describe the choice of these game-plans after a deviation takes place. Suppose
the players are expected to use game-plan vm, but in state t, player it deviates to non-
quitting action a. Let sm+1 denote the state to which transition occurs through action a.
Then, the new game-plan vm+1 is chosen such that vm+1 ∈ Vsm+1(α
k+m) and the expected
reward satisfies
φit(vm+1) ≤ βt(s
m+1, αk+m) +
ε
2m+1
.
Such a game-plan exists by lemma 8 and by the definition of the function β.
Step 2: piε is a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium for initial state s. In order to prove this,
we will show that piε is an ε-equilibrium for initial state s. Since the structure of any
continuation strategy piε[h] is almost identical to that of piε (the only difference is that
piε[h] starts with a continuation game-plan of vm, for some m), a similar proof can be
given that piε[h] is an ε-equilibrium in the subgame after an arbitrary history h.
Take a player i, and a pure strategy σ˜i for player i. We will show that player i cannot
improve his expected payoff by more than ε if he deviates from the strategy piε,i to σ˜i, i.e.
φis(σ˜
i, piε,−i) ≤ φis(pi
ε,i, piε,−i) + ε. (1)
Note that we only consider pure deviations for player i, but one can show the same along
similar lines for arbitrary deviations as well.
Let σi be the strategy for player i which follows the prescriptions of σ˜i until, during play,
a history h occurs, with a final state u controlled by player i, such that either
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(1) the probability that (σ˜i[h], piε,−i[h]) ever prescribes quitting is less than 1/r¯, where
r¯ is the maximal payoff in the game, or
(2) σ˜i[h] prescribes to quit at u.
In both cases, σi[h] tells player i to play according to pii,ε[h]. Notice that the expected
payoff for player i with regard to (σ˜i[h], piε,−i[h]) is at most his expected payoff with regard
to (σi[h], piε,−i[h]). In case σ˜i[h] prescribes quitting, this follows from the fact that piε[h] is
viable with respect to α∗, and since α∗u ≥ r
i
u. In case the probability on quitting is at most
1/r¯, then the expected payoff for player i is at most 1, while his payoff is at least 1 if he
follows σi[h]. (Recall our assumption that all quitting payoffs are at least 1.) Notice that
whenever (σi, piε,−i) deviates from piε, it is by a non-quitting action. Moreover, (σi, piε,−i)
leads to quitting eventually with probability 1.
Since
φi(σi, piε,−i) ≥ φi(σ˜i, piε,−i),
it suffices to show
φi(σi, piε,−i) ≤ φi(piε,i, piε,−i) + ε. (2)
to prove (1). For any m ∈ N∪{0}, let σim be the modification of σ
i which does not deviate
from piε,i any more if game-plan vm+1 becomes active. This means that σim deviates at
most m times. Note that σi0 = pi
ε,i. Let dm denote the expected payoff for player i with
respect to (σim, pi
ε,−i) and initial state s, i.e.
dm = φ
i(σim, pi
ε,−i).
Since (σi, piε,−i) from initial state s leads to quitting eventually, with probability 1, we
must have
φi(σi, piε,−i) = lim
m→∞
φi(σim, pi
ε,−i) = lim
m→∞
dm.
Let H(1) ⊆ Hv
1
denote the set of histories h, such that (i) player i controls the final
state of h, say u, (ii) σi(h) prescribes to deviate by playing some action a ∈ Au. For
h ∈ H(1), let τ(1, h) denote the event that h occurs. The construction of σi guarantees
that a is non-quitting, hence some game-plan v2 will be chosen after the deviation. With
E denoting the expectation with respect to (σi, piε,−i), we have by the choice of v2
E
(
φi(v2)|τ(1, h)
)
=
∑
s2∈Su(a)
pu(a, s
2)βu(s
2, αk+1) + ε4
= γu(a, α
k+1) + ε4
≤ δu(α
k+1) + ε4
= αk+2u +
ε
4
≤ αku + (α
k+2
u − α
k
u) +
ε
4
≤ φi(v1[h]) +
∥∥αk+2 − αk∥∥+ ε4 ,
where the last inequality follows from the viability of v1 with respect to αk. Thus, with P
denoting the probability of an event with respect to (σi, piε,−i), we obtain
d1 − d0 =
∑
h∈H(1)
P(τ(1, h)) ·
[
E
(
φi(v2)|τ(1, h)
)
− φi(v1[h])
]
≤
∥∥∥αk+2 − αk∥∥∥+ ε
4
.
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In a similar fashion,
d2 − d1 ≤
∥∥∥αk+3 − αk+1∥∥∥+ ε
8
,
and in general
dm+1 − dm ≤
∥∥∥αk+m+2 − αk+m∥∥∥+ ε
2m+2
.
Hence
dm − d0 ≤
k+m−1∑
l=k
∥∥∥αl+2 − αl∥∥∥+ m+1∑
l=2
ε
2l
≤
∞∑
l=k
∥∥∥αl+2 − αl∥∥∥+ ε
2
The choice of k implies∑∞
l=k
∥∥αl+2 − αl∥∥ ≤ ∑∞l=k∑u∈S(αl+2u − αlu)
=
∑
u∈S
∑∞
l=k(α
l+2
u − α
l
u)
=
∑
u∈S
[
(α∗u − α
k
u) + (α
∗
u − α
k+1
u )
]
≤ ε2 .
Then
φis(σ
i, piε,−i) = lim
m→∞
dm ≤ d0 +
ε
2
+
ε
2
= φis(pi
ε) + ε,
which completes the proof of (2).
Deterministic transitions: Now suppose, additionally, that all transitions in the game G
are deterministic. Then every quitting game-plan induces one specific history, which ends
when a specific player quits. Thus, quitting game-plans can only induce finitely many
different payoffs. As a consequence, in the definition of βs(t, α
∗), the infimum is attained
for all s, t ∈ S. Moreover, δt(α
∗) = α∗t for all t ∈ S, since α
∗
t = α
k+1
t = δ(α
k) = δ(α∗) for
k sufficiently large. For these reasons, the proof for the general case can be applied with
ε = 0. 
Concluding Remarks. In all examples we have analyzed, we found a pure subgame-
perfect 0-equilibrium. Whether or not this holds in general, is unclear. Nevertheless, in
every game for which infimum is attained in the definition of the function β, and for which
the sequence αk converges in a finite nuber of steps, the existence of a pure subgame-perfect
0-equilibrium follows, just as in the case of deterministic transitions.
One can prove that Vt(α
∗) 6= ∅ for all t ∈ S. The reason is that the constructed game-
plans in the proof of lemma 8 are all stationary. Thus, for a given state t, one can choose
stationary game-plans vkt ∈ Vt(α
k) for all k ≥ 0. Since there are only finitely many
stationary game-plans, it follows that (vkt )k∈N contains a constant subsequence, and it is
straightforward to prove that this constant is a stationary game-plan in Vt(α
∗). We did
not prove in general that δt(α
∗) = α∗t for all t ∈ S, so it remains open whether the vector
equation δ(α) = α has a solution (where δ(α) = (δt(α))t∈S). Although the existence of
such a fixed point would simplify the proof of theorem 9, it would not resolve the issue of
subgame-perfect 0-equilibria.
In the case of deterministic transitions, a polynomial time algorithm exists to determine
the vector α∗. Also, the game-plans in a subgame-perfect equilibrium can be determined
during play when needed, in polynomial time. To see this, note that for every t ∈ S, the
number αkt can only have |S| different values. Since every such number is non-increasing, it
follows that the vector αk can change at most (|S|−1)|S| times before αk+1 = αk. Hence,
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the calculation of α∗ requires at most (|S| − 1)|S| iterations. As one iteration requires the
calculation of |S|2 numbers βs(t, α
k), it suffices to show that βs(t, α) can be calculated in
polynomial time. Since transitions are deterministic, we have
βs(t, α) = min{r
is
u | v ∈ Vt(α) exists that terminates in u}.
Hence, the calculation of βs(t, α) can be done by a check for every u ∈ S whether a viable
game-plan for t with respect to α exists that terminates in u. To do the check, construct
the digraph with vertex-set
V = {u′ ∈ S | αu′ ≤ r
i
u′
u }
and arc-set
A = {(u′, u′′) | an action a ∈ Au′ exists such that pu′(a, u
′′) = 1}.
Now observe that a viable game-plan for t with respect to α terminating in u exists if and
only if the digraph (V,A) has a directed path from t to u. Since the construction of each
digraph and the detection of a directed path can be done in polynomial time, it follows
that the calculation of βs(t, α) requires polynomial time.
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